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SATU PROTOKOL AUTORITI PERAKUAN PENGHALA BARU UNTUK 
MENJAMIN PROTOKOL INTERNET BERGERAK VERSI 6  
 
ABSTRAK 
 
 
Protokol Internet Bergerak versi 6 (IPv6 Bergerak) telah dicadangkan sebagai 
satu protokol piawai untuk memberikan mobility dalam Rangkaian Generasi 
Seterusnya. Sebagai satu protokol baru,  Protokol IPv6 Bergerak mempunyai beberapa 
isu yang perlu ditangani seperti memperluaskan protokol untuk memberikan 
mekanisma ‘hand off’ yang lancar dan pantas, mobility rangkaian, kualiti perkhidmatan 
dan pengurusan lebarjalur bagi aplikasi mobility masa sebenar. Namun, isu yang 
paling utama ialah kerentanan sekuriti IPv6 Bergerak kerana tanpa sekuriti yang 
sempurna, protokol tersebut tidak akan berguna.  
 
IPv6 Bergerak mempunyai tiga komponen utama: nod Bergerak, nod 
Koresponden dan Agen Rumah. Untuk menjamin keselamatan protokol, nod Bergerak 
dan Agen Rumah perlu mempercayai satu sama lain. Nod Koresponden perlu 
mempercayai nod Bergerak kerana nod Bergerak merupakan nod yang memberikan 
dan mengemaskinikan maklumat ke nod Koresponden.  Isyarat-isyarat di antara 
ketiga-tiga komponen ini seharusnya dijamin selamat dan disahkan benar.  
 
Pada masa ini, IPv6 Bergerak ditakrifkan menggunakan penyelesaian sekuriti 
yang dinamakan Kebolehjalanan Kembali (Return Routability) yang membekalkan nod 
Bergerak dengan mekanisma pengesahan dan melindungi isyarat-isyarat yang 
dihantar di antara nod Bergerak dan nod Koresponden. IPv6 Bergerak memberikan 
mandat pada sokongan Sekuriti Protokol Internet (IPSec) di antara nod Bergerak dan 
Agen Rumahnya untuk membolehkan keduanya mempercayai satu sama lain dan 
untuk melindungi isyarat yang dihantar di antara keduanya. Walaupun IPSec mampu 
menawarkan perlindungan yang baik (bergantung kepada algoritma yang digunakan), 
  xiv 
penggunaan IPSec dalam Kebolehjalanan Kembali tidak semestinya merangkumi 
semua bidang sekuriti. Penyelesaian ini tidak dapat mengatasi serangan Orang 
Tengah. 
 
Objektif utama tesis ini ialah untuk mereka bentuk satu protokol sekuriti baru 
untuk memberikan tahap pengesahan dan sekuriti yang lebih ketat bagi IPv6. Protokol 
sekuriti ini perlu memberikan satu tahap sekuriti dan pengesahan yang lebih ketat 
berbanding dengan mekanisme yang ada sekarang iaitu Kebolehjalanan Kembali. 
Selain daripada itu, protokol sekuriti yang dicadangkan ini akan memberikan satu 
rangka kerja konsisten yang menggantikan pelaksanaan IPSec menyeluruh dalam 
IPv6 Bergerak. Protokol sekuriti yang dicadangkan ini dinamai Sijil Penghala Autoriti 
Perakuan (CARC) akan juga memastikan perlindungan daripada serangan Orang 
Tengah.  
 
  Protokol yang baru dicadangkan ini telah disahkan dengan jayanya dengan 
menggunakan dua versi pengesah Murphy, Murphy 3.1 dan Murphy Ganda Tiga. 
Dalam kedua-dua pengesahan, protokol yang baru telah dibuktikan lebih selamat 
daripada protokol Kebolehjalanan Kembali.  
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A NEW ROUTER CERTIFICATION AUTHORITY PROTOCOL FOR 
SECURING MOBILE INTERNET PROTOCOL VERSION 6  
 
ABSTRACT 
 
 
Mobile Internet Protocol version 6 (Mobile IPv6) has been proposed as a 
standard protocol to provide mobility in Next Generation Networks. Mobile IPv6 
protocol as a new protocol has a few issues that need to be addressed such as 
extending the protocol to provide smooth and fast hand off mechanisms, network 
mobility, quality of service and the bandwidth management of real time mobility 
applications. However, the biggest issue is the security vulnerability of Mobile IPv6 
because without proper security the protocol will be useless.  
 
Mobile IPv6 has three main components: the Mobile node, the Correspondent 
node and the Home Agent. For the protocol to be secure, the Mobile node and its 
Home Agent should trust each other. The Correspondent node should trust the Mobile 
node because the Mobile node is the one giving and updating the information to the 
Correspondent node. The signals between all of these components should be secured 
and authenticated.  
 
Mobile IPv6 is currently defined with a security solution called Return Routability 
that provides the Mobile node with an authentication mechanism and protects the 
signals between the Mobile node and the Correspondent node. Mobile IPv6 mandates 
the Internet Protocol Security (IPSec) support between the Mobile node and its Home 
Agent to let them trust each other and to protect the signals between them. While 
IPSec may offer strong protection (depending on the algorithm used), the use of IPSec 
within Return Routability does not necessarily cover all areas of security. This solution 
is especially vulnerable to the Man-in the-Middle attack. 
 
  xvi 
The main objective of this thesis is to design a new security protocol to provide 
higher levels of authentication and security for Mobile IPv6. This security protocol has 
to provide a level of security and authentication which is higher than the current 
mechanism which is Return Routability. Additionally, the new proposed security 
protocol will provide a consistent framework replacing the comprehensive IPSec 
implementation within Mobile IPv6. This proposed new security protocol called 
Certification Authority Router’s Certificate (CARC) will also ensure protection against 
the Man-in the-Middle attack. 
 
  The new proposed protocol was successfully verified using two versions of the 
Murphy verifier, Murphy 3.1 and Triple Murphy. In both verifications, the new protocol 
proved to be more secure than the Return Routability protocol.  
 1 
CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 
This chapter is divided into five sections, the first section introduces Internet 
Protocol Version 6 (IPv6), it then goes to give a brief description of the concept of 
mobility, followed by the reasons as to why Mobile IPv6 is preferred over Mobile IPv4. 
After that, how Mobile IPv6 works are described. The importance of Binding Update 
signals has been outlined. An overview of the current problem in the Mobile IPv6 
security protocol is also described. Then the last sections give the proposed idea as 
well as the thesis contribution. 
 
1.1  Background  
   The rapid increase in the number of Internet users, combined with the expected 
growth in the number of Mobile Internet Protocol (Mobile IP) users requires a scalable 
and flexible IP technology, which is not provided by IPv4 efficiently. IPv6  is the next 
generation protocol (Silvia, 2000, Davies, 2003, RFC2460, 1998 and IPv6 Ready, 
2003) designed by the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) to replace the current 
version of the Internet Protocol, IPv4 (RFC791, 1981). IPv6 offers a big package of 
capabilities, of which ‘addressing’ is the most visible component. Even though the 
addressing issue gets a lot of attention (RFC2373, 1998), it is only one of many 
important issues that IPv6 designers have tackled. Other IPv6 capabilities include 
mobility, integrated quality of services, automatic configuration, and more efficient 
network route aggregation at the global backbone level. 
 
Mobility support in IPv6 (RFC3775, 2004, Hesham, 2004 and HZNET, 2005) is 
particularly important, as mobile devices are likely to account for a majority or at least a 
substantial fraction of the population of the Internet during IPv6’s lifetime. Mobile IPv6 
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is an extension of IPv6 that need to use one of the extension headers called “Mobility 
Header” and need to exchange Mobile IPv6 signals called “Binding Update” signals  
Next section explains the idea of IP mobility and then lists the reasons as to 
why mobility support in IPv6 (RFC3775, 2004) is preferred compared to mobility 
support in IPv4 (RFC3344, 2002). 
 
1.1.1 IP Mobility  
The meaning of mobility does not necessarily indicate mobility for wireless 
devices as it can also mean wired devices that can be disconnected from a specific 
point and reconnected to other points.  Mobile computing offers many advantages such 
as access to the Internet anytime, anywhere.  
 
Mobile IP refers to the mobility aspect of IP that allows nodes to move to 
different networks all over the world while maintaining upper layer connectivity 
(Webopedia Computer, 2007). This is not to be confused with ‘portability’ that allows 
nodes to move to different networks all over the world and remain reachable, while 
causing upper-layer connections to be disrupted each time a node relocates as it has 
to obtain a new IP address at each location.  
 
Mobile IP is intended to enable nodes to move from one IP network to another 
without changing the mobile node's IP address. The idea behind this is to allow a 
Mobile node to be always addressable by its "home address". Packets that are routed 
to the Mobile node will use the Mobile node’s home address regardless of the Mobile 
node’s current point of attachment to the Internet. The Mobile node may continue to 
communicate with other nodes (stationary or mobile), after moving to a new network.  
The movement of a Mobile node away from its home network is thus transparent to 
upper-layer protocols and applications. 
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 IP Mobility in IPv4 applies the concept of Mobile IP, using the capabilities 
offered by the IPv4 protocol. IPv4 is proven to be robust, easily implemented and 
interoperable, and has stood the test of scaling, to be the size of today’s Internet, using 
different mechanisms such as Network Address Translation (NAT) (WIKIPEDIA, 
2007a) and Classless Inter Domain Routing (CIDR) (WIKIPEDIA, 2007b). However, the 
design of IPv4 did not take into consideration certain issues, including mobility. 
 
 IPv6 on the other hand, provides many capabilities compared to IPv4 such as 
having more addresses, header extension, mobility support, built-in quality of service, 
address auto-configuration, and host discovery. 
 
Thus Mobile IPv6 applies the concept of Mobile IP using the capabilities offered 
by the IPv6 protocol and tackles the limitations that exist in Mobile IPv4. Figure 1.1 
demonstrates the flow of designing the Mobile IPv6 protocol. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1.1: Flow of Designing Mobile IPv6 protocol 
 
Draft of 
Mobile IPv4 
 
Mobile IPv6 as a 
proposed 
standard  
Limitations of the 
Mobile IPv4 draft 
IPv6 IPv4 
Mobile IP 
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Mobile IPv6 protocol has become the standard for mobility, now and for future 
Internet applications rather than Mobile IPv4. The seven main reasons for this are 
listed below: 
1- Mobile IPv6 support for Route Optimization: Route optimization is not 
found in Mobile IPv4 because of the inflexibility of the IPv4 header (GIAC, 2003). The 
Home Address Option header and Routing header which facilitate the route 
optimization are missing in IPv4. This integration of route optimization functionality 
allows direct routing from any Correspondent node to any Mobile node, without 
needing to pass through the Mobile node’s home network. This eliminates the problem 
of triangle routing present in Mobile IPv4.  The integration of route optimization reduces 
the amount of re-routing and tunnelling work for the Home Agent. This results in less 
traffic passing through the home link, thus reducing bottlenecks at the home link, and 
thereby saving 50 percent of Internet performance and bandwidth compared to using 
triangle routing (Nokia Research Center, 2002a).  
 
2- Home Address Option header: Home Address Option header, which is one 
of the Extension Headers in IPv6 allows Mobile nodes to co-exist efficiently with routers 
that perform ingress filtering (Nokia Research Center, 2002b). A Mobile node now uses 
its care-of address as the source address in the header of packets it sends, allowing 
the packets to pass normally through ingress filtering routers whereas the home 
address of the Mobile node is carried in the Home Address Option header. 
 
Another advantage of using a Home Address Option header is allowing the use 
of a care-of address in the packet to be transparent to the upper-layers such as 
Transport Control Protocol (TCP) and User Datagram Protocol (UDP).  The ability to 
process correctly a Home Address option in a received packet is required in all IPv6 
nodes, whether mobile or stationary, host or router.  
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3- Home-of Address as the Multicast source address:  This can be used 
within each packet's IP header to simplify routing of multicast packets sent by a Mobile 
node (Youn-Hee and Seung-Hee, 2006). With Mobile IPv4, the Mobile node has to 
tunnel the multicast packets to its Home Agent in order to transparently use its home 
address as the source of the multicast packets.  With Mobile IPv6, the Home Address 
Option header allows the home address to be used and still be compatible with the 
multicast routing that is based in part on the packet's source address.  
 
4- Foreign agents not needed: There is no longer any need to deploy special 
routers as "foreign agents" as is proposed in Mobile IPv4.  In Mobile IPv6, the Mobile 
nodes make use of the enhanced features of IPv6, such as Neighbor Discovery 
(RFC2461, 1998) and Address Autoconfiguration (RFC2462, 1998), to operate in any 
location away from home without any special support required from its local router.  
 
5- Movement detection mechanism in Mobile IPv6: This provides bi-
directional confirmation of a Mobile node's ability to communicate with its default router 
in its current location. This confirmation provides a detection of a "black hole" situation 
that may exist in some wireless environments. The link in such environments to the 
router does not work equally well in both directions, such as when a Mobile node has 
moved out of a good wireless transmission range from the router. In contrast, in Mobile 
IPv4, only the forward direction (packets from the router to the Mobile node) is 
confirmed, allowing the black hole condition to persist. 
  
6- IPv6 Neighbor Discovery: Home Agent intercepts the packets for the 
Mobile node that arrive at the home network, using IPv6 Neighbor Discovery rather 
than Address Resolution Protocol (ARP) mechanism. The use of Neighbour Discovery 
improves the robustness of the protocol (Eddy and Ishaq, 2006) and simplifies the 
implementation of Mobile IP because it is not concerned with any particular data link 
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layer as is required in ARP.  
 
7- IPv6 Anycast: The dynamic Home Agent address discovery mechanism in 
Mobile IPv6 uses IPv6 Anycast which returns a single reply to the Mobile node (Ata et 
al., 2005), rather than the corresponding Mobile IPv4 mechanism, which uses IPv4 
directed broadcast and returns a separate reply from each Home Agent on the Mobile 
node's home link.  The Mobile IPv6 mechanism is more efficient and more reliable, 
since only one packet needs to be sent back to the Mobile node.   
 
The above reasons clearly indicate the advantages of Mobile IPv6 over Mobile 
IPv4. Next section provides an overview of Mobile IPv6 protocol. 
 
1.1.2 Overview of Mobile IPv6 Protocol 
The two main objectives of the Mobile IPv6 protocol are enabling IPv6 nodes to 
move from one IP network to another IP network without any interruption in connection, 
and optimizing the route between the nodes, thereby making the Mobile node and its 
Correspondent node communicate directly with each other (RFC3775, 2004). Mobile 
IPv6 protocol has three base operations, which are Movement Detection, Triangle 
Routing, and Route Optimization: 
 
Operation one: Movement Detection has two mechanisms: “Router 
discovery” and Construction of the new Mobile node’s IPv6 address “Care of Address”. 
 
Operation two: Triangle Routing has another two mechanisms whereby the 
first one is the “Binding Update with Home Agent”, which is the responsibility of the 
Mobile node to send Binding Update signals to the Home Agent to inform it about a 
new IPv6 address. The second mechanism is ”proxy and tunnelling” which is the 
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responsibility of the Home Agent to intercept the packets addressed to the Mobile 
node’s original address and tunnel it to the Mobile node’s new address. 
 
Operation three: Route Optimization is the operation that eliminates the use 
of triangle routing and makes for direct communication with any other node. Route 
Optimization is achieved via two steps: the first step is when the Mobile node sends 
Binding Update signals to inform its Correspondent node about its new IPv6 address. 
The second step is the direct communication whereas the Correspondent node sends 
packets directly to the Mobile node. 
 
The protocols used to secure the Binding Update with the Home Agent and the 
Binding Update with the Correspondent node respectively are considered “security 
extended protocols”. The security protocol used to secure the Binding Update with the 
Home Agent is called Internet Protocol Security (IPSec) whereas the security protocol 
used to secure the Binding Update with its Correspondent node is called Return 
Routability (RR). Mobile IPv6 operations and protocols are shown in Figure 1.2. 
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Figure 1.2: Mobile IPv6 Operations 
 
The example given below which is about the behaviour of a laptop as a Mobile 
node explains one example of mobility in IPv6 in a clearer manner. 
 
1.1.3 Mobile IPv6 Example 
Figures 1.4, 1.5, 1.6 and 1.7, respectively will be used for this example. In the 
figures the author will use the Mobile IPv6 terminology, which is explained in the next 
page. 
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If more than one device at home or in the office have an IPv6 address, then the 
use of a router at that place is needed.  The Home Agent is a router that advertises its 
prefix to the nodes within its home network. Then the Mobile node can construct its 
IPv6 address which is called Home of Address from the prefix of the router combined 
with the interface identifier of the device. Interface identifier is the MAC address 
mapped to the Extended Unique Identifier (EUI-64) address as shown in Figure 1.3.   
 
 
Figure 1.3: IPv6 Address 
 
The home network is the network where the Mobile node (laptop in this 
example) has been booted and configured for the first time with the attached Home 
Agent. Any node or device that leaves the home network for a while to another network 
is considered a Mobile node. The network that the node visits, or moves to is called 
foreign network. In this example, the home network is setup at home and the foreign 
network is considered at office, as shown in Figure 1.4 
 
Router prefix Interface identifier 
HA: The router that functions as Home Agent in home network. 
Mn: A laptop as a Mobile node 
Cn: Stationary or mobile PC as Correspondent node 
BU: Binding Update signal 
BA: Binding Acknowledgment signal 
HoA: Mobile node’s Home of Address 
CoA: Mobile node’s Care of Address 
MAC: The physical address associated with the network card 
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Any other node that communicates with the Mobile node is considered its 
Correspondent node. The Correspondent node can be in the same visited network or 
from the other network as shown in Figure 1.4.  
 
Figure 1.4, shows the movement of a Mobile node from a home network to an 
office network. In the office network, the Mobile node, which is the laptop, has to 
discover the local router by using the Neighbour Discovery mechanism. The laptop 
then constructs its new IPv6 address from the router prefix and laptop’s MAC address 
using the Stateless Autoconfiguration mechanism. The newly constructed address is 
called Care of Address.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1.4: Mobile node’s Movement Detection  
 
 
After the Mobile node has constructed a new IPv6 address, the Mobile node 
should inform its Home Agent about this new address using the Binding Update signal 
as shown in Figure 1.5, Message 1. The Home Agent replies with a Binding 
Acknowledgment as shown in Message 2. 
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Figure 1.5: Binding Update with Home Agent 
 
The Correspondent node from the other network (Figure 1.6), which sends 
packets to the Mobile node’s original address as shown in Message 1, does not know 
about the new address of the Mobile node. The Home Agent will intercept the packets 
by using a proxy mechanism and then tunnel the packets to the Mobile node’s new 
address in Message 2. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1.6: Triangle Routing  
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Upon receiving the tunnelled packets, the Mobile node will send Binding Update 
signals to inform the Correspondent node about the Mobile node’s new address as 
shown in Figure 1.7. The Correspondent node will reply with a Binding 
Acknowledgment to Mobile node. After exchanging the binding signals, the direct 
communication between the Mobile node and its Correspondent node can be achieved. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1.7: Route Optimization  
 
In Mobile IPv6, binding signals are considered to be one of the cornerstones of 
the protocol. Only binding signals can keep the Mobile node reachable at any location 
with any IPv6 address, which is the main goal of Mobile IPv6. The next section defines 
binding signals in Mobile IPv6. 
 
1.1.4 Binding Update in Mobile IPv6 
 The association between a Mobile node's Home of Address and the Mobile 
node’s Care of Address for a specific life time is known as Binding. If the Mobile node 
informs the other nodes about this association, then the Mobile node is doing Binding 
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Updates. Other nodes that receive this Binding Update signal will confirm receiving it 
with a Binding Acknowledgment as shown in the example above. 
 
The Binding Update has to be sent from the Mobile node to the Home Agent 
and this process is called Binding Update with the Home Agent or Home Agent 
Registration. Binding Update signals also have to be sent from the Mobile node to the 
Correspondent node and this is called Binding Update with Correspondent node.  
 
1.2      The Current Problem 
The Mobile IPv6 still has some issues that not solved yet . However, the biggest 
issue is the security vulnerability within Mobile IPv6, because without proper security, 
the protocol will be useless. 
  
There are two solutions for securing Mobile IPv6’s Binding Updates. The first 
solution concerns securing the Binding Update signals between the Mobile node and 
its Home Agent by the use of IPSec (RFC3776, 2004).  
 
The second solution, concerns the securing of the Binding Update signals 
between the Mobile node and its Correspondent node, which is more complex due to 
the absence of a pre-relationship between the Mobile node and its Correspondent 
node. The Mobile IP group has designed and documented (RFC3775, 2004) the 
protocol Return Routability. The next section gives a brief explanation about the two 
mechanisms, Return Routability and IPSec. Figure 1.8 shows the current security 
protocols used to secure the Mobile IPv6 protocol. 
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Figure 1.8: Security Protocols Used to Secure Binding Signals in Mobile IPv6 
 
       Return Routability (RR) 
The Return Routability protocol enables the Correspondent node to obtain 
assurance that the Mobile node is in fact addressable at its claimed Care of Address as 
well as at its home address. In other words, this lets the Mobile node prove that it is 
addressable by both addresses which are the original one (Home of Address) and the 
new one (Care of Address). 
 
  Only with this assurance is the Correspondent node able to accept Binding 
Updates from the Mobile node, which causes the Correspondent node to direct that 
Mobile node's data traffic to its claimed Care of Address.  
 
 During Return Routability the two nodes, mobile and correspondent, should 
exchange keys that have to be used for encryption purposes and also for the 
authentication. The problem in Return Routability (Wafaa and Sureswaran, 2003) is 
that there are some locations near the Correspondent node, which allow the attacker to 
sniff the keys and convince the Correspondent node to believe that the attacker is the 
original Mobile node. There is some research on improving the performance of Return 
Routability when there is more than one Mobile node communicating with the same 
Correspondent node (Feng et al., 2005) but such improvement still face this type of 
attack because the messages still have to be sent in plain text. 
Cn
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      Internet Protocol Security (IPSec) 
IPSec (Cisco, 2006) is a general purpose protocol used to secure packets in the 
IP layer. IPSec contains a lot of options and policies, which are stored in the Security 
Policy Database (SPD). Options such as the keys, the algorithms of encryption and 
authentication and the parameters associated with each algorithm need to be decided 
before each session of communication for each IP’s data traffic occurs.  
 
IPSec also has a Security Association Database (SAD), where the negotiated 
algorithms with the key between the two nodes with their identities are stored. IPSec 
Security Association (SA) is unidirectional. When establishing secure communications 
for bidirectional communication between two nodes, one needs to configure security 
associations for each direction.  
  
IPSec has two mechanisms, Authentication Header (AH) (RFC2402, 1998), 
which is used for authentication and an Encapsulation Security Payload (ESP) 
(RFC2406, 1980), which is used for encryption.   
 
In Mobile IPv6, IPSec is used to secure the Binding Update signals between the 
Home Agent and the Mobile node (RFC3776, 2004). Both AH and ESP are needed to 
achieve the authentication and the integrity of the Binding Update signals.  Each 
mechanism has its own tunnelling and algorithm.  Manual configuration is needed to 
set the keys and algorithms for the Security Association Database with the Home of 
Address as the identity for the Mobile node. IPSec is considered a battery taxing 
protocol for mobile devices.  
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1.3       The Proposed Solution 
  A Certification Authority (CA) is a trusted third party organization or company 
that issues digital certificates to users. A digital certificate is an electronic document 
binding together some pieces of information, such as a user’s identity and public key. 
Digital certificates are used with applications such as emails or online Banking due to 
the non-repudiation (high authentication) that is provided to the other party. The other 
party should only verify the certificate by checking the signer.  
 
  Two major types of certificates exist: end-entity certificate and CA certificate. 
An end – entity certificate is issued by a Certification Authority to an entity that does not 
in turn issue certificates to another entity. A CA certificate is issued by a Certification 
Authority to an entity that is also a Certification Authority and so may issue an end- 
entity certificate. Certificates can be issued to users as well as routers and nodes. 
Certificates based on users’ identity is described in many publications, however, 
certificates for routers and nodes still remain a new field of research. 
 
  The focus of this thesis is on a CA certificate which allows the design of a 
Router Certification Authority protocol. In this case, the Certification Authority issues a 
certificate for routers who in turn issues sub-certificates to the end nodes. This protocol 
(Wafaa and Azman, 2006) allows the generation, renewal, and revocation of the router 
certificate as well as the generation, renewal, and revocation of the node sub-
certificate. Such a protocol is novel and has never been designed before.  
 
 This new protocol eliminates the need for Return Routability within the Mobile 
IPv6 environment (see Figure 1.9). This is done while still ensuring an even higher 
level of security than that provided by Return Routability (with or without IPSec). 
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  This new protocol can prevent attacks faced by Mobile IPv6 like the Man-In-
The-Middle attack. Other security attacks like Replay Attack, Simple Denial of Service 
and Spoofing of IPv6 addresses can also be avoided in Mobile IPv6 using the new 
protocol. Chapter 3 explains this in more detail.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1.9: Our Protocol Used to Secure Mobile IPv6 Signals 
 
1.4      Thesis Contribution 
  
 The contributions of the thesis are: 
 
 An CA router certificate protocol which allows the generation, renewal, and 
revocation of the router certificate as well as the generation, renewal, and 
revocation of the node sub-certificate 
 Constructing a new format of Router Certificate which is the extension of the 
Certificates X.509v3. 
 Using the CA router certificate protocol to create a more secure environment 
within Mobile IPv6  
 
 
1.5      Thesis Overview 
 
This thesis is organized into six related chapters. Chapter 1 presents the 
background of this thesis. It starts by presenting an introduction of IPv6, it then goes to 
give a brief description of the concept of mobility, followed by the reasons as to why 
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Mobile IPv6 is preferred over Mobile IPv4. After that, how Mobile IPv6 works are 
described. The importance of Binding Update signals, which are needed to achieve the 
mobility in IPv6, have been outlined. An overview of the current problem in the mobile 
IPv6 security protocol is also described. Then the last section introduces the proposed 
idea as well as the thesis contribution.  
  
Chapter 2 gives an overview of the problem in the current protocol and then 
discusses the alternative solutions proposed by other researchers. 
 
Chapter 3 is the core of the thesis which presents the design of the new 
protocol named CARC. This chapter gives a detailed description of the new protocol. 
This includes the design details for the generation of the router’s certificate and the 
node sub-certificate as well as the renewal and revocation processes. The chapter also 
describes the possibility of the attacks in each process and how they can be avoided. 
Implementation of the first version of CARC was done. However, simulation results led 
to the second and final (improved) version of CARC that is presented in the second last 
section. Last section discuss the operation of CARC within Mobile IPv6 and its 
advantages 
 
Chapter 4 discusses the security protocol verifier (Murphy) as well as the 
description of CARC simulation and formal verification is given in this chapter. Some of 
the verification scenarios are given in full detail.  
 
Chapter 5 is the summary of the verification results and its discussions.  
 
Chapter 6 is the conclusion and an outline of possible future work to continue 
and enhance the proposed research within this thesis.  
Base 
Operations 
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CHAPTER TWO 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
 
This chapter analyses all the attacks that exploit the Mobile IPv6 signals, explains 
in detail the current security protocols used in Mobile IPv6 and their problems and then 
describes alternative solutions proposed to replace the current security protocols within 
Mobile IPv6. 
 
2.1      Attacks That Exploit Mobile IPv6 Signals  
Mobile IPv6 signals are usually referred to as Binding Update signals in Mobile 
IPv6 literature. This thesis will use both names alternatively. The Binding Update signal is 
an association of the Mobile node’s Home of Address (HoA) and Care of Address (CoA) 
for a specific lifetime (t). The Mobile node has to send these signals to the Home Agent 
and then to the correspondent node after each movement. These signals are vulnerable to 
many attacks. Attacks that exploit the Binding Update signals in Mobile IPv6 can be 
classified into two types as listed below and explained in our work (Wafaa and 
Sureswaran, 2003). Figure 2.1 shows all the attacks:  
1- Attacks when Binding Update signals are not authenticated or secured 
2- Attacks when Binding Update signals are authenticated and secured  
 
2.1.1 Attacks when Binding Update Signals are not Authenticated or 
Secured 
If Binding Update signals are not authenticated and secured, then the attacker can 
send spoofed Binding Update, which can result in one of the following attacks: 
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1- Attack against secrecy and integrity  
2-  Attack using HoA to send unwanted data to any host  
3- Attack using CoA to send unwanted data to any host 
 
The explanation for the attacks is in the next sections. 
 
Figure 2.1: Attacks that Exploit BU in Mobile IPv6 
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2.1.1.1 Attack Against Secrecy and Integrity 
An attacker sends a spoofed Binding Update to the Correspondent node as shown 
in Figure 2.2. An attacker can capture the data intended for the Mobile node and by 
pretending to be the Mobile node can hijack the connection with the Correspondent node, 
or establish new spoofed connections. Consequently, the attacker is able to see and 
modify the packets sent between the Correspondent node and the Mobile node.  
 
These attacks are possible when the Mobile node and the Correspondent node 
support Route Optimization (RO) and the attacker knows their IP addresses. Strong 
encryption and integrity protection can prevent all sorts of attacks against data secrecy and 
integrity.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.2: Attack Against Secrecy and Integrity  
 
[1] Mn → Cn (captured by attacker): BU 
[2] Attacker →Cn: spoofed BU  
[3] Cn→ Mn (Captured by attacker): BA 
[4] Attacker → Mn: spoofed BA 
:Mn :Cn 
BU 
: Attacker 
Spoofed BU
BA
Spoofed BA 
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2.1.1.2 Attack Using HoA to Send Unwanted Data to Any Host  
When the Binding Update signal is not authenticated, the attacker can choose any 
arbitrary address as its Home of Address (HoA) and thus target any Internet node. What 
happens is that an attacker claims to be a Mobile node with the HoA address similar to the 
target IP address. Then the attacker sends a Binding Update with its real IP as CoA and 
the target IP address as HoA as shown in Figure 2.3. The attacker then waits for the 
Binding Updates to expire, which will cause the Correspondent node to redirect the data 
traffic to the target IP address. The attacker can keep the stream alive by spoofing 
acknowledgements. Strong authentication for the identity of the machine and the 
association with its home address can prevent this type of attack. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.3: Attack Using HoA to Send Unwanted Data to Any Host 
 
[1] Attacker (fake Mn) → Cn : spoofed BU [Target address as attacker’s HoA, Attacker’s 
          CoA, t]  
[2] Cn →Attacker: BA 
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2.1.1.3 Attack Using CoA to Send Unwanted Data to Any Host  
This is similar to the type of the attack mentioned above only that in this sort of 
attack an attacker can choose any arbitrary address as its Care of Address (CoA) and thus 
target any Internet node. An attacker claims to be a Mobile node with the CoA similar to 
the target IP address. 
 
 Ingress filtering in the attacker's local network can control the problem but not 
solve it. Ingress filtering prevents the spoofing of source addresses but the attack is still 
possible if the attacker in the same network of the targeted address.  An attacker can also 
target one or more IP addresses within the network by using this attack and the above one 
in tandem. Strong authentication of real IPv6 addresses is needed to mitigate this type of 
attack. 
 
2.1.2 Attacks when Binding Update Signals are Authenticated and Secured  
 This type of attack usually is related to a particular security protocol like the attacks 
that exploit the Return Routability protocol which are explained in section 2.3.1 and also 
related to the attacks that exploit the security solutions, which are explained in section 2.4. 
However Replay Attack should be considered in any security solution proposed for Mobile 
IPv6. The next section explains the Replay attack in Mobile IPv6. Other attacks will be 
explained in section 2.3.1 and 2.4. 
 
2.1.2.1 Replay Attack in Mobile IPv6 
Any protocol that authenticates Binding Update signals will have to consider Replay 
Attack (WIKIPEDIA, 2007c), that is, an attacker may be able to replay recent authenticated 
Binding Updates to the Correspondent node and, that way, direct packets to the Mobile 
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node's previous location. What happens is that an attacker can capture the packets and 
impersonate the Mobile node if it reserves the Mobile node's previous address after the 
Mobile node has moved away and then replays the previous Binding Update to redirect 
packets back to the previous location as shown in Figure 2.4. The attack is a concern if the 
Mobile node is moving so frequently that it sends the next Binding Update before the 
previous Binding Update has expired.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.4: Replay Attack 
 
[1] Mn → Cn: BU1 (Binding with the Mobile node’s current CoA) 
[2] Cn → Mn: BA 1 
[3] Attacker → Cn: BU2 (Binding with the Mobile node’s previous CoA) 
[4] Cn →Attacker: BA1 
 
Because of these attacks, the Mobile IP group has to design security protocols to 
secure the Binding Update signals. These security protocols are explained in the next 
section. 
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